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PRIORITY OF ASSIGNEE OF PART INTEREST IN
CHOSE IN ACTION

I

was inevitable that the economic depression of the last
decade should generate legal problems of first magnitude
in the wake of the financial disaster. This not only resulted
from governmental efforts, by new and untried experiments,
to deal effectively with the situation-as in the case of new
labor laws, new security laws, and the like-but, more important, in the view of the common law, from the evaluation
and satisfaction of the conflicting claims of investors to the
steadily shrinking values of corporate and individual wealth.
Here, as in the case of its long history of trial and error, inclusion and exclusion, the genius of the common law was
again found equal to its historic role.
A substantial number of investors, who found the value
of their securities in a precarious condition as the depression
developed, were those who had put their savings in bonds,
certificates and other securities protected by iortgages on
real estate. The genius of American finance had developed
new forms of security, hitherto unknown in the banking,
world, which were sold to hundreds of thousands of investors
in amounts aggregating billions of dollars.1 In legal effect,
these new securities sold by mortgage guaranty companies
-that is, companies organized to guaranty the payment of
mortgages-were assignments of part interests in the mortgages owned by the guaranty companies to the investors.
Thus, a small investor with but two or three thousand dolJars at his command might buy a part interest in a large
mortgage securing a debt of several hundred thousand dollars, or even more. Needless to say, neither the investor, nor
those who sold the guaranteed certificates, gave any thought
to the conflicting legal relations that might arise should the
time come when the decline in realty values would render the
proceeds of these mortgages insufficient to pay off the entire
indebtedness. Such a possibility may well be said not to have
been within the contemplation of the parties. And it is precisely because this unforeseen possibility occurred that many
1 Finkelstein and Clarke, Mortgage Banks (1937)
52, 53, 54.

12 ST. JOHn's L. REv.
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legal problems arose, among those, the specific one discussed
in these pages.
It frequently happened that the mortgage guaranty company, in selling participations in the mortgage, would retain
a part interest in the mortgage for itself. This would arise
either because the market would not absorb the entire mortgage, or because, to satisfy occasional customers, the guaranty company was compelled to repurchase participation certificates previously sold to investors. But, whatever the cause,
the fact remains that when collapse overtook the guaranty
companies, there were many mortgages in which the companies held interests, either which had not been previously
sold, or which had been reacquired by them. These company
held interests aggregated many millions of dollars. At once
the claim was made by the representatives of the investors,
that where the proceeds of the mortgage were insufficient to
pay the entire indebtedness, the interest owned by the guaranty company was subordinate to the certificates held by the
public. To sustain this position, reliance was had on a principle of the common law: that when a person assigns a part
interest in a chose in action, the assignee is entitled to priority of payment and if the full amount is not collected, the
assignee must be paid off first, and the assignor receive only
what is left. This principle, established in the days of more
simple problems, was the basis of the claim that the certificate holders at large were entitled to priority over the issuing guaranty companies.
This principle of the common law was, however, not as
firmly established as those who propounded it asserted. It
had, to be sure, been accepted by a number of text writers.
Thus, Pomeroy, in his Equity Jurisprudence,declared:2
"When the mortgagee assigns one or more of the
notes, and retains the remainder of the series, it is
generally held that the assignee is entitled to priority
of lien as against the mortgagee, with respect to the
note or notes so transferred; and this rule operates
without regard to the order in which the notes held
by the two parties mature."
2

POMEROY, EQUITY

JURISPRUDENCE

(4th ed. 1918)

§ 1203.
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Again, Professor Wiltsie, in his work on Mortgage Foreclosures, expressed the view that: 3
"irrespective of the time of maturity of several notes
secured by a mortgage, it may be stated as the general rule, that where a person owning all or several
of the notes transfers a less number for value to a
third person or persons, retaining some, all transferees
are entitled to receive full satisfaction of their notes
out of the proceeds of sale before the payment of the
notes still owned by the transferror."
And, in Jones on the Law of Mortgages of Real Property,the
view is expressed that: 4
"Where a holder of a mortgage assigns a part of
it, although he warrants only the existence of the debt
at the time of the transfer, it would be contrary to
good faith to permit him, after receiving the money
for this part of the claim, to come into competition
with his assignee, if the property prove insufficient to
pay the claims of both."
The text writers, however, were not unanimous in their
views on this subject, and Professor Walsh, 5 in his book on
Mortgages,expressed a contrary view, holding that the better
considered cases give parity to the assignor with his assignee,
so that where a part interest in a mortgage or other chose in
action is assigned, the proceeds, if not sufficient to pay the
claim in full, are divided pro rata between the assignor and
the assignee.
In examining the decided cases upon which these text
writers rely, we find, in veritable fact, a conflict of view.
Whereas the largest number of cases appear to support the
proposition that the assignee of a part interest in a chose in
3 WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES

(4th ed. 1927) p. 374.

4 JoNEs, LAW OF MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 2189. See also 3 TFANY,
REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 2551-2; (1936) 10 TuLANE L. REv. 304.

5WALSH,

MORTGAGES

(1st ed. 1934) § 64.
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action is entitled to priority over his assignor,6 in a number
of jurisdictions well reasoned cases hold to the contrary. 7
The New York court had not had frequent occasion to
pass upon the point, but in the case of Fullerton v. National
s had declared:
B. & T. Ins. Co.,
" * * * the case may be regarded in the aspect most
favorable to the appellants, as one where part only of
6 Cullum v. Erwin, 4 Ala. 452 (1842); Griggsby v. Hair, 25 Ala. 327
(1854); Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co. et al. v. Hall, 58 Ala. 1 (1877) (quoting
Cullum v. Erwin, s=pra, with approval); Knight v. Ray, 75 Ala. 383 (1883);
Brewer v. Atkeison, 121 Ala. 410, 412, 25 So. 992 (1898); Farmers Savings
Bank v. Murphree, 200 Ala. 574, 76 So. 932 (1917) ; Hand v. Kemp, 207 Ala.
309, 310, 92 So. 897 (1922) ; Irwin v. Citizens Bank of Hattiesburg, et al., 209
Ala. 211, 95 So. 897 (1923); Collins v. Forman, 230 Ala. 370, 161 So. 238
(1935); North American Life Assurance Co. of Chicago v. Collins, 237 Ala.
17, 185 So. 375 (1938) ; Kissimmee Everglades Land Co. v. Carr, 88 Fla. 387,
102 So. 335 (1924); McClure v. Century Estates, Inc., 96 Fla. 568, 588, 120
So. 4 (1928) ; Hall v. University Realty Co., 97 Fla. 639, 121 So. 808 (1929);
Miami Oil Co. v. Florida Discount Corp., 102 Fla. 209, 135 So. 845 (1931);
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Orr, 109 Fla. 184, 147 So. 271 (1933); Roberts v.
Mansfield, 32 Ga. 228 (1860) ; Berry v. Smith, 97 Ga. 782, 25 S.E. 757 (1895);
Berry v. Van Hise, 148 Ga. 27, 95 S.E. 690 (1918) ; Ottauquechee Say. Bank,
et al. v. Elliott, 172 Ga. 656, 158 S.E. 316 (1931) ; Georgia Realty Co. v. Bank
of Covington, 19 Ga. App. 219, 91 S.E. 267 (1917) ; Kuppenheimer v. Chicago
Title & Trust Co., 163 Ill. App. 127 (1911) ; Robbins v. Slavin, 292 Ill. App. 479
(1937) ; People's Nat. Bank of Monmouth v. Johnson, 271 Ill. App. 507 (1933) ;
Lake View Trust & Sav. Bank v. Rice, 279 Ill. App. 53B (1935); Wilber v.
Buchanan, et al.,
85 Ind. 42 (1882) ;.Parkhurst v. Watertown Steam Engine
Co., 107 Ind. 594, 8 N. E. 635 (1886); Richardson v. McKim, 20 Kan. 346,
351 (1878) ; Louisville Title Co.'s Receiver v. Crab Orchard Banking Co. et al.,
249 Ky. 736, 61 S.W. (2d) 615 (1933) ; Dorman et al. v. Banker's Trust Co.,
259 Ky. 430, 82 S. W. 494 (1935) ; Meriwether v. New Orleans Real Estate
Board, 182 La. 649, 162 So. 208 (1935) ; Ventriss v. His Creditors, 20 La. Ann.
359 (1868); Barkdull v.-Herwig, 30 La. Ann. 618 (1878); Abney & Co. v.
Walmsley, 33 La. Ann. 589 (1881); LaPlace v. LaPlace, 43 La. Ann. 284,
8 So. 914 (1891); Gumbel v. Boyer, 46 La. Ann. 1499, 16 So. 465 (1894);
Fandal v. Baer, 14 Parish of Orleans App. 117 (La. -) ; Salzman v. Creditors,
2 Rob. 241 (La. 1842) ; Bryant v. Damon, 6 Gray 564 (Mass. 1856) ; Foley v.
Rose, 123 Mass. 557 (1877) ; Anderson v. Sharp, 44 Ohio St. 260, 6 N. E. 900
(1886) ; Lawson v. Warren, 34 Okla. 94, 124 Pac. 46 (1912) ; Mothersead v.
Wiley, 114 Okla. 105, 243 Pac. 718 (1926) ; Cannon v. McDaniel, 46 Tex. 303
(1876) ; Whitehead v. Fisher, 64 Tex. 638 (1885); Douglas v. Blount, 22 Tex.
Civ. App. 493, 55 S.W. 526 (1900); McClintic v. Wise's Adm., 25 Grat. 448
(Va. 1874) (the rule in this case has been changed by statute); Jenkins v.
Hawkins, 34 W. Va. 799, 12 S.E. 1090 (1891); Thomas v. Linn, 40 W. Va.
122, 135, 20 S. E. 878 (1894).
7Dixon v. Clayville, 44 Md. 573 (1875); English v. Carney, 25 Mich. 178
(1875); Wilcox v. Allen, 36 Mich. 160 (1872) ; Jennings v. Moore, 83 Mich.
231, 47 N. W. 127 (1890); Pugh v. Holt, 27 Miss. 461 (1854); Trustees of
Jefferson College v. Prentis, 29 Miss. 46 (1855); Green v. Morris, 117 Miss.
635, 78 So. 550 (1918) ; Blair v. White, 61 Vt. 110, 17 Atl. 49 (1889) ; Bartlett
v. Wade, 66 Vt. 629, 30 Atl. 4 (1894) ; Fair v. Hartley, 81 P. (2d) 640 (Utah
1938).
8 100 N. Y. 76, 2 N. E. 629 (1885).
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a debt has been assigned, the assignor reserving the
other part to itself. In such case it is obvious the
parties must either share pro rata in the security, or
one must have priority over the other. It seems most
reasonable that in the absence of a plain declaration
to the contrary, it should be applied first to the payment of that part of the debt which was assigned."
The problem was first squarely presented to the Court of
Appeals in a mortgage certificate case, Title Guarantee and
Trust Company v. Mortgage Commission of the State of New
York, 9 which resulted from the submission -of a controversy
upon an agreed statement of facts to the Appellate Division
in the first instance. In that case, it became necessary for
the court to deal with this principle of law in its bare essentials. The case involved the relative rights of the Title Guarantee and Trust Company in certain mortgages, participations in which had been sold to the public. The Title Guarantee and Trust Company had retained an interest in its
mortgages, consisting both of unsold portions of the mortgages and reacquired certificates. The plaintiff had not guaranteed the payment of these certificates, but the payment had
been guaranteed by its affiliate, Bond and Mortgage Guarantee Company. The agreed statement of facts was silent with
respect to the relationship between the plaintiff and its
affiliate.
The Court of Appeals was thus presented with the problem of determining whether it would follow those states in
which it had been held that the assignee was entitled to
priority, or whether it would follow those states where parity
was allowed. The court said: 10
"Under the decisions in this State, it appears well
established that the owner of a mortgage who assigns
a part of it does not, as a matter of law, in the absence
of an agreement to the contrary, postpone his interest
to that of his assignee."
o273 N. Y. 415, 7 N. E. (2d) 841 (1937).
"oId.at 423.
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With regard to the above quoted statement from the Fullerton case, the Court of Appeals expressed the view that: 11
"the statement must be considered in the light of the
facts which, as shown by the quotation, involved a
trust relationship, a relationship, as a result of which,
the assignor was equitably not entitled to enforce his
legal claim before full satisfaction of the interest of
the vendee."
The implication, of course, was that in the instant case there
was no fiduciary relationship between the Title Guarantee
and Trust Company and the certificate holders. Considering
the weight of authority in other jurisdictions, the Court of
Appeals had this to say: 12
"An examination of the authorities in other jurisdictions leaves doubt as to just where the weight of
authority may rest as between the two rules, one requiring a preference to assignees of a part of a security, the other requiring pro rata distribution between an assignor and assignees. Many cases cited
as authority for one or the other rule will be found
to be based on facts indicating intention for or against
preference which makes them of little aid. The States
in which it has been asserted that the assignee takes
priority are not in accord as to what is to be the basis
of priority, in some it being held that assignees take
preference according to the due date of the obligations
and in others according to the date of the assignments.
They are in accord only in holding that where there is
an assignment of a part of a security, it is an assignment pro tanto."
And finally, the court concluded with these words:

13

"We believe that in this State the courts are committed to the proposition that in the absence of an
agreement or proven intent to the contrary, the ex"Id. at 424.
12 Id. at 426.
13 Id. at 428.
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istence of a trust relationship or proof of some equitable reason why priority should exist in favor of an
assignee, the assignor of part of a mortgaged indebtedness who has not assumed a liability as guarantor is
entitled to share pro rata with his assignee in the proceeds of insufficient security."
It will be seen from an examination of this statement
that the Court of Appeals definitely aligned this State with
the views of those jurists who held with the views expressed
by Professor Walsh, and those other jurists who had held
that the mere assignment of a part interest in a mortgage
without more confers upon the assignee no priority over the
assignor. To this general rule, there were, however, three
exceptions:
1. Where the assignor guaranteed the payment of
the debt to the assignee;
2. Where a trust relationship existed between the
assignor and the assignee; and
3. Where the agreement between the assignor and
the assignee expressly conferred priority upon the
latter.
In these three cases, the assignee of a part interest in a
chose in action was said to have priority over the assignor.
It was not long before an extrapolation of the principles of
the Title Guaranteeand Trust Company case found its way
into the opinions of the New York courts dealing with cases
arising under one or more of the exceptions. In the main,
it may be said that the views found to have been expressed
by Mr. Justice Frankenthaler at nisi prius have been upheld
by the Court of Appeals.
In one of the earliest cases, in which the decision of Mr.
Justice Frankenthaler was affirmed without opinion by both
the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals, Mr. Justice
Frankenthaler said: 14
-4 it re 545 West End Avenue (Lawyers Mortgage Co.), 157 Misc. 813,
814, 284 N. Y. Supp. 740 (1936), aff'd witwut opinion, 248 App. Div. 715 (1st
Dept. 1936), aff'd without opinion, 272 N. Y. 554, 4 N. E. (2d) 733 (1936).
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"that the rights of the mortgage company and the certificate holders must be determined in accordance with
the terms of the agreement between them. In the instant case this agreement is embodied in the certificate
issued by the mortgage company to the investors in
this mortgage. Each certificate reads: 'Lawyers
Mortgage Company (hereinafter termed 'The Company') in consideration of the sum of
Dollars, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, has
assigned and transferred and by these presents does
hereinafter
assign and transfer unto
termed 'The Assured', an undivided share or interest
to the extent of said principal sum in a certain Bond
of

, * *

*

Bond made by
etc."
Company recorded,'
I

and Mortgage securing said

to Lawyers Mortgage

It should be noted that this opinion of Mr. Justice Frankenthaler was written before the decision of the Court of
Appeals in the Title Guarantee and Trtst Company case.
With prophetic anticipation, the learned Justice concluded: 15

"In the instant case there is no affirmative evidence of
an intent that the shares retained shall share pro rata
with those assigned."
He accordingly decreed that the certificate holders had priority over the mortgage company. The sam conclusion was
reached by the court in Matter of New York Title &.Mortgage Co. (Series FW-1), 1 decided at the same time, and
likewise affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division
and the Court of Appeals.
So much stress had been placed by the courts, both at
Special Term and on appeal, upon the precise words of the
certificate which constituted the agreement between the mortat 815.
155 Misc. 651, 280 N. Y. Supp. 745 (1935), rearguinent, 157 Misc. 271,
283 N. Y. Supp. 553 (1935), aff'd without opinion, 248 App. Div. 715 (1st
Dept. 1936), motion for leave to appeal granted, 248 App. Div. 815 (1st Dept.
1936), aff'd without opinion, 272 N. Y. 556, 4 N. E. (2d) 734 (1936), inotion
for reargument denied, 275 N. Y. 531, 11 N. E. (2d) 733 (1937).
15 Id.
16
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gage company and the certificate holder, that a multiplicity
of cases were presented to the courts seeking an interpretation of the meaning of individual certificates.' 7 On the one
17 Lawyers Mortgage Co. (Simon Borg), 151 Misc. 744, 272 N. Y. Supp.
390 (1934), aff'd, 242 App. Div. 617 (1st Dept. 1934); Lawyers Title &
Guaranty Co. (5101-5113-13th Avenue, Brooklyn), N. Y. L. J., July 17, 1935,
p. 168, col. 7; Lawyers Mortgage Co. (1254 Sherman Avenue), N. Y. L. J.,
July 20, 1935, p. 207, col. 4; National Mortgage Corp. (Series NM), N. Y.

L. J., Nov. 16, 1935, p. 1890, col. 4, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 20, 1936, p. 1776, col. 4;
Lawyers Title & Guaranty Co. (236 West 70th Street), 157 Misc. 516, 294
N. Y. Supp. 208 (1935), 164 Misc. 292, 298 N. Y. Supp. 666 (1937); Lawyers
Westchester Mortgage & Title Co. (Matter of Hill, Series No. 6-6481), N. Y.
L. J Feb 28 1936, p. 1056, col. 2; New York Title & Mortgage Co. (Series
B-1i), N. Y. L. j., March 12, 1936, p. 1277, col. 1; New York Title & Mortgage
Co. (Series N-9; 310 West 85th Street), N. Y. L. J., March 13, 1936, p. 1299,
col. 2, rev'd on reargument, 163 Misc. 196, 296 N. Y. Supp. 273 (1936);
Lawyers Mortgage Co. (30 Clarke Place), N. Y. L. J., April 28, 1936, p. 2156,
col. 1, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 6, 1936, p. 1554, col. 3; People ex rel. Van Schaick,
Matter of Frisch, N. Y. L. J., June 5, 1936, p. 2879, col. 1; New York Title
& Mortgage Co. (Series F), 163 Misc. 37, 296 N. Y. Supp. 557 (1937),
reargument, N. Y. L. J., March 10, 1937, p. 1224, col. 5; New York Title &
Mortgage Co. (Series A-1), N. Y. L. J., Oct. 26, 1936, p. *1370, col. 3;
Lawyers Mortgage Co. (1823-31 White Plains Rd.), N. Y. L. J., Nov. 5, 1936,
p. 1530, col. 2, rearguinent, Nov. 15, 1936, p. 1858, col. 2; Lawyers Title &
Guaranty Co. (465 Ocean Avenue), 162 Misc. 184, 294 N. Y. Supp. 397 (1937);
Bond & Mortgage Guarantee Co. (Guar. No. 210669, 200 Marcy Place), 253
App. Div. 876 (1st Dept. 1938), motion for leave to appeal to Court of Appeals
denied, 254 App. Div. 650 (1st Dept. 1938); Lawyers Mortgage Co. (1158
Boynton Ave.), N. Y. L. J., Feb. 17, 1937, p. 824, col. 5; Lawyers Mortgage
Co. (1235 Stratford Ave.), N. Y. L. J., Feb. 20, 1937, p. 893, col. 6; New York
Title & Mortgage Co. (381-3 Park Ave.), 163 Misc. 318, 296 N. Y. Supp. 644
(1937), aff'd, 254 App. Div. 722 (1st Dept. 1938) ; New York Title & Mortgage
Co. (Series F-i), N. Y. L. J., March 11, 1937, p. 1224, col. 6; New York Title
& Mortgage Co. (Series C), N. Y. L. J., March 11, 1937, p. 1224, col. 6;
Lawyers Mortgage Co. (3169-75 Grand Blvd.), N. Y. L. 3., March 27, 1937,
p. 1520, col. 5; New York Title & Mortgage Co. (Series B-1), 163 Misc. 42,
296 N. Y. Supp. 550 (1937); New York Title & Mortgage Co. (Series C-3),
N. Y. L. J., April 12, 1937, p. 1814, col. 1; New York Title & Mortgage Co.
(Series F-i; C), N. Y. L. J., May 12, 1937, p. 2385, col. 1; New York Title &
Mortgage Co. (Series Q-1), N. Y. L. J., June 11, 1937, p. 2947, col. 3; New
York Title & Mortgage Co. (Series C-3), 166 Misc. 147, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 154
(1938); Lawyers Mortgage Co. (1470 Midlan Avenue), N. Y. L. J., Aug. 7,
1937, p. 344, col. 5; Lawyers Title & Guaranty Co. (Forshay), 169 Misc. 266,
7 N. Y. S. (2d) 354 (1938), aff'd, 254 App. Div. 653 (1st Dept. 1938), motion
for leave to appeal to Court of Appeals denied, 254 App. Div. 675 (2d Dept.
1938), motion for leave to appeal to Court of Appeals granted by Court of
Appeals, N. Y. L. J., July 8, 1938, p. 65, col. 4, aff'd without opinion, 279 N. Y.
571 (1938) ; Bond & Mortgage Guarantee Co. (223 Second Avenue), 169 Misc.
196, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 254 (1938), aff'd, 255 App. Div. 765 (1st Dept. 1938) ;
State Title & Mortgage Co. (25-61-43rd Street, L. I. C.), N. Y. L. J., Nov.
13, 1937, p. 1630, col. 7; Lawyers Title & Guaranty Co. (Chase Nat. Bank,
Matter of Mortgage Commission), 165 Misc. 590, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 264 (1937);
National Mortgage Co. (1601-5 Atlantic Avenue), N. Y. L. J., Jan. 13, 1938,
p. 190, col. 6; Home Title Ins. Co. (Matter of Mortgage Commission, 1259
East 13th Street, Bklyn.), N. Y. L. J., March 12, 1938, p. 1047, col. 6, aff'd, 255
App. Div. 635 (2d Dept. 1938); Lawyers Title & Guaranty Co. (1189 Cromwell Avenue), N. Y. L. J., April 1, 1938, p. 1581, col. 1; Lawyers Mortgage
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hand, the rehabilitator of the mortgage companies, as rep-

resentative of all of their creditors, was steadfastly attempting
to urge upon the court that the express language of the cer-

tificates rendered it necessary to hold that the mortgage company was entitled to parity; on the other hand, the Mortgage
Commission and the trustees for the certificate holders were,

with equal steadfastness, attempting to interpret the language of these certificates to show that there had been no ex-

press reservation of parity on the part of the mortgage companies and that, therefore, under the rule of the Title Guarantee and Trust Company case, the certificate holders were
entitled to priority. Here, as elsewhere, in the problem of

interpretation of the language of contracts, the courts were
in actual fact being called upon to determine the meaning

of language when applied to a state of facts which was not
present to the minds of the contracting parties when the

contract was initially drawn.

As in so many other cases,

the courts found themselves stepping warily in order to avoid

passing from the realm of interpretation into that of creation and, as we shall see, they did not invariably achieve complete success.
In order to demonstrate the pitfalls to which the court

was exposed, it is only necessary to compare the decision of
the Court of Appeals in Matter of The Title and Mortgage
Guaranty Company of Sullivan County (Series S-2)18 and
Matter of New York Title and Mortgage Company (Series
C-2).19 In both cases, the problem was the one we are alCo. (Matter of Mortgage Commission), 168 Misc. 810, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 605
(1938) ; Guaranteed Mortgage Co. of N. Y. (80 Riverside Drive), N. Y. L. J.,
May 24, 1938, p. 2509, col. 4; Lawyers Mortgage Co. (Matter of Mortgage
Commission), 168 Misc. 762, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 605 (1938), aff'd, 255 App. Div.
840, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 661 (1st Dept. 1938) ; Union Guarantee & Mortgage Co.
(165 Bennett Ave.), N. Y. L. J., Dec. 15, 1938, p. 2155, col. 1; Bond & Mortgage Guarantee Co. (327-333 East 57 St.), N. Y. L. J., March 13, 1939, p.
1152, col. 2; Lawyers Mortgage Co. (Mort. No. 51179), N. Y. L. J., May 8,
1939, p. 2120, col. 6; New York Title & Mortgage Co. (Series C-2, 383 Park
Ave.), N. Y. L. J., May 24, 1939, p. 2390, col. 6; Lawyers Mortgage Co. (731735 West 183 St.), N. Y. L. J., May 24, 1939, p. 2390, col. 6; Lawyers Title &
Guaranty Co. (Pink v. Thomas), N. Y. L. J., July 17, 1939, p. 127, col. 1,
aff'd, 257 App. Div. 354 (1st Dept. 1939); Union Guarantee & Mortgage Co.
(3110-12 Wilkinson Ave.), N. Y. L. J., June 14, 1939, p. 2747, col. 7; National
Mortgage Co. (209-19 Monroe St.), N. Y. L. J., June 30, 1939, p. 3022, col. 1.
is 275 N. Y. 347, 9 N. E. (2d) 957 (1937).

19 278 N. Y. 488, 15 N. E. (2d) 430 (1938), mnotion for reargument denied,
278 N. Y. 718, 17 N. E. (2d) 138 (1938).
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ready familiar with, of determining whether the certificate
holders were entitled to priority over the mortgage company
in the insufficient proceeds of the mortgage. In both cases,
the interpretation depended upon the precise meaning of the
contract which was contained in the certificate. In both cases,
the court at Special Term had held that the certificate holders were entitled to priority. Yet the Court of Appeals distinguished the two cases from each other and awarded priority to the certificate holders in the S-2 decision and parity to
the mortgage company in the C-2 decision. In order to form
an opinion with respect to the soundness of either of these
two cases, it will be necessary to compare the two contracts
that were before the court.
Relevant Provisions of Certificate in Series S-2
1. "The Company guarantees
to the holder, the successors,
legal representatives and assigns of the holder, hereby
and by the policy aforesaid,
payment of the principal and
interest of this certificate
at the times hereinabove
stated
2. "1

*
*

2

this certificate shall

be a coordinate lien with all
other certificates of said
mortgage now or hereafter
issued and any share retained
by the Company".
3. 1**

Relevant Provisions of Certificate in Series C-2
1. "That there shall be no
preference or priority in
favor of any share in the deposited bonds and mortgages, * * *2"

2. "The Company guarantees
to the registered holder hereof payment of the principal
sum hereby secured, * * * and
any interest at the rate aforesaid * * "

* the Company shall 3. "The Company may be the
have the right without ex- holder or owner or pledgee of
pense to the holder hereof to one or more of said certificollect the amount so due, cates."
and out of the proceeds of
such collection to retain so
much as may remain after
paying to the holder hereof
whatever may be due to such
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Relevant Provisions of Cer- Relevant Provisions of Certificate in Series C-2
tificate in Series S-2
holder of principal and interest on this certificate as herein provided."
4. "In the event of the payment of a part of said principal sum secured by said
mortgage, the Company shall
have the right to retire any
certificates to an equivalent
amount or to hold the amount
so paid for the benefit of the
holders of the certificates of
said mortgage."

4. "There shall be no preference or priority in favor of
any share in the deposited
bonds and mortgages * * * or

of any certificate of interest
representing the same, as
against any other share or
certificate, whether held by
the Title & Mortgage Company or whether held by any
other holder, but each share
shall participate equally with
any other share with the deposited bonds and mortgages
* * * and the proceeds thereof, save as otherwise provided
in said certificates."
5. "The Company guarantees
to the holder hereof the payment of the principal and interest of the deposited bonds
and mortgages * * * to an ex-

tent sufficient to pay the principal and interest of all certificates issued under said
agreement."
It will be seen from a comparison of the provisions of
the contracts in the S-2 case with those of the C-2 case that
both contracts result in conflicting inferences. In each contract there are provisions which seem to imply that parity
between the mortgage company and the certificate holders
was intended. On the other hand, each of the contracts also
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contains provisions from which a contrary inference must
be drawn.
Thus, in S-2, there is, first of all, the provision for guaranty which, under the rules above stated, would imply priority for the certificate holders. Then there is provision number 2, from which one could easily infer that parity for the
mortgage company was intended, as it is expressly stated
that all the certificates shall be of coordinate lien regardless
of whether they are publicly held or retained by the company.
At the same time, provision 3 seems to impose an obligation
on the company to pay the certificate holders before they
realize any funds for themselves; and the same may be said
about provision 4.
In the C-2 case, a similar difference of interpretation
will flow from several of the paragraphs. Thus, paragraph 1
would seem to imply that the parties intend parity. On the
other hand, as stated in the Title Guflra'tee and Trust Conpe y case, the inference from the guaranty provided in paragraph 2 would lead to the conclusion that priority for the
certificate holders over the mortgage company was intended.
Again, paragraph 5, as was strongly urged by Professor
Michael F. Dee, would lead inevitably to the conclusion that
the parties intended payment to be made to the certificate
holders out of the mortgages deposited as collateral for them
before any payment could be realized by the company. On
the other hand, paragraph 4 gives the contrary implication,
as, indeed, does paragraph 3.
Faced with this duality of meaning and interpretation
flowing from different paragraphs in the same contract, the
Court of Appeals had held, in the S-2 case, that the certificate
holders were entitled to priority, but in the C-2 case, that
the company was entitled to parity. It is difficult, on strictly
logical grounds, to sustain the difference in decision in these
two cases, but it is not unknown in the history of the common
law that courts of last resort have felt that a line of decisions, having gone too far in one direction, needs to be arrested in order to prevent radical applications of fundamental principles and to preserve the elements of primary
doctrine.
There are a number of situations in which the Court of
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Appeals has not yet interpreted the precise language of the
contract. Nor has there been any definitive determination
of a proposed distinction between the position of the mortgage company with respect to an unsold portion of a mortgage and with respect to a repurchased portion of a mortgage. 20 As to these matters, final determination lies in the
future.
In spite of the vast importance of these decisions to many
hundreds of thousands of certificate holders, involving millions of dollars of their funds, the history of this doctrine
portends more for the future than it does for the past. In
the first place, it renews confidence in the orderly development of the common law and in its ability to meet new conditions as they arise. It titivates our courage as we face the
legal problems of the future. Again, these decisions are another illustration of what the law students are apt to overlook in the busy necessity of assimilating first principles,
viz., that behind every decision of the courts stand the social
and economic forces of the day. It is in the background of
these problems and their solution that the court molds the
principles of the common law to meet the exigencies of each
moment as they arise. And finally, from this small bud in
the forest of legal rules and principles, we gather renewed
realization that the better rule emerges in that system of
law where each of the claimants presses his interest to the
utmost and an impartial tribunal is empowered to weigh and
evaluate the differences between them and to accord the
maximum satisfaction to each.
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